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Comparing Possible Proxies of Corporate Bond Liquidity
We consider eight different proxies (issued amount, coupon, listed, age, missing
prices, yield volatility, number of contributors and yield dispersion) to measure cor-
porate bond liquidity and use a five-variable model to control for interest rate risk,
credit risk, maturity, rating and currency differences between bonds. The null hy-
pothesis that liquidity risk is not priced in our data set of euro corporate bonds is
rejected for seven out of eight liquidity proxies. We find significant liquidity premia,
ranging from 9 to 24 basis points. A comparison test between liquidity proxies shows
limited differences between the proxies.
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1 Introduction
The effect of liquidity on bond yields has been frequently studied in the recent finance litera-
ture. Since liquidity is a rather subjective concept, a lot of measures have been proposed to
approximate the extent to which a bond is liquid or illiquid. For corporate bonds, where most
transactions occur on the over-the-counter market, direct liquidity measures (based on trans-
action data) are often not reliable and difficult to obtain. Therefore, researchers resorted to
indirect measures (‘proxies’) that are based on bond characteristics and/or end-of-day prices.
This paper makes a number of contributions to this literature on measuring corporate bond liq-
uidity. First, we pay great attention to control for other sources of risk than liquidity to properly
identify the premium that is associated with liquidity risk. As far as we know, this is the first
study in this strand of the literature to use the well-known Fama and French (1993) two-factor
bond-market model to control for interest rate and credit risk and to augment it with individual
bond characteristics, such as rating and maturity, as recommended by Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer and
Swaminathan (2001). Second, we do not make a subjective choice of which liquidity proxies
to work with, but implement as much of the proxies proposed in the literature as possible on
our data set. We evaluate the relative performance of all proxies, employing a method recently
applied by Goldreich, Hanke and Nathy (2002) on Treasury bonds. Third, the vast majority of
empirical papers on sovereign and corporate bond liquidity studied data from the United States
and relatively little is known about the extent to which these results apply to the euro market.
Although euro corporate bond data were also studied by other authors, including Annaert and
De Ceuster (1999), McGinty (2001) and Dı´az and Navarro (2002), none of them analyzed the
euro corporate bond market using data on individual bonds over a substantial time period.
We use the Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) methodology of liquidity-sorted portfolios to
test whether liquidity is priced in the euro-denominated corporate bond market. We use eight
proxies of bond liquidity: issued amount, coupon, listed, age, missing prices, yield volatility,
number of contributors and yield dispersion; see Section 3.4 for a detailed description. For
each liquidity proxy, we construct P , mutually exclusive portfolios by sorting all bonds on their
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value of the liquidity proxy and assigning the first 100/P % of the bonds to portfolio 1, the
next 100/P % to portfolio 2, and so on, until the last 100/P % of the bonds are assigned
to portfolio P . The P time series of portfolio yields are subsequently used in two regression
models. In the first model, each portfolio has a constant liquidity premium. In the second
model, the liquidity premium is time-varying and a function of the size of liquidity proxy. In
both models, the null hypothesis states that the portfolios’ liquidity premiums are jointly equal
to zero. We use a detailed data set consisting of daily yields of individual corporate bonds
which are denominated in euros or in one of the currencies of the euro-participating countries
(’legacy’ currencies). The results for the first regression model indicate that the null hypothesis
of no liquidity premium is rejected for seven out of eight liquidity proxies. So, we find strong
evidence of priced liquidity. For the second model the null hypothesis of no liquidity effects is
even always rejected. To determine the relative effectiveness of the different liquidity proxies,
we run a series of regressions with pairwise combinations of the liquidity proxies, as proposed by
Goldreich et al. (2002). This allows us to rank the different liquidity proxies we consider. The
results of the tests point out that no proxy stands out from the rest.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the
methodologies and results of the empirical liquidity literature. Section 3 describes how we
control for other sources of risk than liquidity risk and how we estimate the liquidity premium.
This section also describes the portfolio construction and our eight liquidity proxies. Next,
Section 4 describes the data that are used to test the hypotheses of corporate bond liquidity.
Section 5 presents the results from the model implementation. Finally, Section 6 summarizes
the paper.
2 Literature
Both theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrate that liquidity risk is priced in security
markets. The market microstructure models of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Boudoukh and
Whitelaw (1993) and Vayanos (1998) show that transaction costs cause liquidity differences
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between securities, and that illiquid securities have higher expected rates of return than liquid
securities.
Empirical evidence on priced liquidity risk in equity markets is provided by, e.g., Amihud and
Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Haugen and Baker (1996), Brennan,
Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) and Chordia,
Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001). These studies had to cope with an important drawback:
they approximated a stock’s expected returns by realized returns, which are, by definition,
realizations of a stochastic process instead of expectations. For bonds, on the other hand, the
yield-to-maturity can be used as expected return measure.
A substantial part of these studies analyzed data from the US Treasury market, where bonds
are issued on a regular basis and price data are easily available. Also, controlling for other sources
of risk than liquidity risk is relatively easy in this market, because credit risk is not an issue.
To control for interest rate risk, authors have used several approaches. The first approach is
to create pairs of zero-coupon bonds with exactly the same maturity date; this fully eliminates
interest rate risk. Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Kamara (1994) and Strebulaev (2001) used
this method to test for liquidity differences between US Treasury notes and bills; Fleming (2002)
compared US Treasury bonds with small and large outstanding amounts. The second approach
is to form triplets of coupon bonds, which, with suitable bond weights, also eliminate interest
rate risk. Elton and Green (1998) used this method to examine yield differences between bonds
with high and low trading volume. Another frequently used approach is to analyze the yield
difference between the on-the-run (most recently issued) bond and off-the-run (older) bonds;
this will, however, leave a small maturity gap between the bonds. Warga (1992), Goldreich
et al. (2002) and Krishnamurthy (2002) used this method on US Treasury data and Boudoukh
and Whitelaw (1991, 1993) on Japanese data. All papers mentioned above, except Strebulaev
(2001), found statistically significant liquidity premiums.
Research on corporate bond liquidity is substantially more difficult, because of the presence of
credit risk and the smaller number of bonds per issuer. A strategy of matching bonds by maturity
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and issuer, similar to the Treasury studies above, will typically generate too few observations.
As far as we know, there is only one study that successfully applied this approach: Crabbe and
Turner (1995) analyzed pairs of new issues, issued by the same borrower, with identical issue
and maturity dates, but with different issue sizes. The most popular approach is to regress
yields (and occasionally bid-ask spreads or trading volumes) of individual corporate bonds on
a range of proxies for interest rate, credit and liquidity risk. Examples of studies that used
this method include Gehr and Martell (1992), Shulman, Bayless and Price (1993), Chakravarty
and Sarkar (1999), Alexander, Edwards and Ferri (2000), Hong and Warga (2000), Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), Ericsson and Renault (2001), Schultz (2001), Dı´az and
Navarro (2002), Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2002) and Mullineaux and Roten (2002).
Remarkably, all papers studied US data, except Dı´az and Navarro (2002) who studied Spanish
corporate bonds. Cornell (1992), Fridson and Jo´nsson (1995) and Annaert and De Ceuster
(1999) used similar regression approaches, but on indices of US mutual funds, US high yield
bonds and euro investment grade bonds, respectively. Finally, McGinty (2001) analyzed one
month of euro corporate bond data using scatter plots and tables. All papers mentioned above,
except for Gehr and Martell (1992) and Crabbe and Turner (1995), found evidence of significant
liquidity premiums for at least one liquidity proxy.
To summarize, almost all empirical papers on bond liquidity found significant liquidity effects
for government and corporate bonds. However, none of the studies used the portfolio-based
testing methodology often employed in the literature on equity liquidity. Moreover, although
there is ample research on the US market, the evidence for euro-denominated bonds is limited to
papers that study index data (Annaert and De Ceuster, 1999), a small sample period (McGinty,
2001) or data from one country (Dı´az and Navarro, 2002).
3 Methodology
This section describes the methodology used to test whether liquidity risk is priced in the euro-
denominated corporate bond market. First, we explain how we control for other sources of risk
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than liquidity risk using Fama and French (1993) and Gebhardt et al. (2001). Next, we describe
the implementation of our models and the Goldreich et al. (2002) method to compare different
liquidity proxies. Finally, we present our liquidity proxies.
3.1 Controlling for Other Sources of Risk
In measuring a security’s liquidity premium, it is important to realize that the security’s expected
return is not only affected by liquidity risk but also by other sources of risk. Theory (like the
reduced form credit risk models following Jarrow and Turnbull (1995)) nominates two risk
factors: (i) interest rate risk and (ii) credit risk. We use the Fama and French (1993) bond-
market model as a starting point to proxy for interest rate and credit risk. They found two
variables that explained over 90% of the variation in realized excess returns on corporate bond
portfolios; the excess return was defined as the portfolio return minus the one-month Treasury
rate. The first risk factor was calculated as the long-term Treasury bond return minus the one-
month Treasury rate at the end of the previous period. Thus, this slope factor should explain
variations in excess bond returns by changes in the slope of the Treasury yield curve. The second
factor was defined as the return on a market portfolio of long-term corporate bonds minus the
long-term Treasury bond return. This credit factor was therefore related to the likelihood of
credit events in the corporate bond portfolio.
Unlike Fama and French (1993), we do not us a bond’s realized return as proxy for its ex-
pected return, but, following the bond liquidity literature, we use the bond’s yield-to-maturity.
Yields have a distinct advantage over realized returns: they really represent the market’s expec-
tation of a bond’s expected return to maturity; realized returns are, by definition, realizations
of a stochastic process rather than expectations. In all regressions, we thus replace the excess
realized return by the excess yield, which is defined as the yield minus the short-term default-free
rate.
A second modification to the Fama-French model concerns the choice of the default-free
interest rate curve, which is required to calculate the excess yields and the two risk factors.
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Instead of using the government curve, we use the swap curve. Our motivation is that since
the end of the 1990s, fixed-income investors have moved away from using government securities
to extract default-free interest rates and started using interest rate swap rates instead; see also
Golub and Tilman (2000) and Kocic´, Quintos and Yared (2000). In Section 5.1, we test both
proxies for default-free rates.
Gebhardt et al. (2001) looked at the validity of the Fama-French bond-market model by an-
alyzing whether individual bond characteristics could rival the two Fama-French factors. Three
characteristics were considered: rating, duration and Altman (1968) Z-scores. They concluded
that both Fama-French factors and bond characteristics were important in explaining bond
yields and recommended a model containing four variables: the Fama-French slope and credit
factors, rating and duration. In Section 5.2, we show that for our data set a third characteristic
is relevant: an indicator variable that equals 1 if a bond is euro-denominated, and 0 otherwise.
Therefore, our null model to control for other sources of risk consists of five variables: two
Fama-French factors and three characteristics; the model is described formally in Section 3.2.
Clearly, all our conclusions about the relation between liquidity and bond yields are based on
the assumption that our five-variable pricing model correctly and fully controls for interest rate
and credit risk; see also Dimson and Hanke (2001).1
To the best of our knowledge, no other paper in the liquidity literature has employed both the
Fama-French factors and individual bond characteristics to control for other sources of risk. One
paper, Ericsson and Renault (2001), used the Fama-French factors, but not the characteristics;
several papers made use of the rating and maturity characteristics, including Alexander et al.
(2000), Hong and Warga (2000) and Mullineaux and Roten (2002), but not of the Fama-French
factors; most papers used a list of ad-hoc proxies.
3.2 Models
Unlike prior papers on bond liquidity, we do not estimate our models on individual bonds, but
on constructed portfolios, like in the equity literature; see e.g. Amihud and Mendelson (1986),
1We further assume that taxes do not affect bond yields.
6
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Haugen and Baker (1996). Specifically, we follow
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) by creating liquidity-sorted portfolios and testing whether
the constructed portfolios have significantly different expected returns, while controlling for
other sources of risk as described above. From the literature, we collect eight liquidity proxies,
which are detailed in Section 3.4. For each proxy i, we create P mutually exclusive portfolios
as follows (the choice for P will be discussed at the end of this section).
Every two weeks, we order all bonds in the sample by their value of liquidity proxy i; only
bonds that have already been issued and have not yet matured on that date are used in the
ordering. Then, we assign the first 100/P % of the bonds to portfolio 1, the next 100/P % to
portfolio 2, and so on, until the last 100/P % of the bonds are assigned to portfolio P . The
sort order is chosen such that portfolio 1 contains the bonds that proxy i hypothesizes to be the
most liquid and portfolio P the most illiquid. Every day we calculate the yield of each portfolio
as the unweighted average of the yields of the bonds that make up the portfolio. A bond’s yield
is determined as follows: if the bond is not quoted, we disregard it for that day; if it is quoted
by one pricing source, we use that yield; if it is quoted by more than one pricing source, we use
the average quote. For each proxy i, we have now created P time series of portfolio yields.
As in Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), the time series are used in two regression models.
In the first model, each portfolio has a constant liquidity premium αp. Formally, model 1 is as
follows
Y ipt = α
i
p +
2∑
j=1
βijpFjt +
3∑
j=1
γijC
i
jpt + ε
i
pt,
E[εipt] = 0
E[εiptε
i
qs] = σ
i
pq, if t = s, and 0 otherwise,
(1)
where superscripts i refer to liquidity proxy i, Y ipt is the excess yield of the p
th proxy-i portfolio
on day t, F1t and F2t are the two Fama-French factors and Ci1pt, C
i
2pt and C
i
3pt are the three
portfolio characteristics. The coefficients are interpreted as follows: αip is the portfolio-specific
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liquidity premium, βijp is the portfolio-specific factor loading for Fama-French factor j and
γij is the marginal effect of portfolio characteristic j. Note that the Fama-French factors have
portfolio-specific coefficients and common variable values, while the characteristics have common
coefficients and portfolio-specific variable values.
The disturbance terms are allowed to be heteroscedastically distributed and cross-sectionally
correlated, but we do assume that they are uncorrelated across time. To correct for possible au-
tocorrelations in the disturbances, we apply the Newey and West (1987) estimator for the covari-
ance matrix. For proxy i, we estimate all 3P+3 coefficients (αi1, . . . , α
i
P , β
i
11, . . . , β
i
1P , β
i
21, . . . , β
i
2P ,
γi1, γ
i
2, γ
i
3) for all P portfolios simultaneously with Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS)
as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR); see e.g. Greene (2000, Chapter 15).
To test the null hypothesis that proxy i has no liquidity premium, or in other words, that the
two Fama-French factors and the three portfolio characteristics fully explain the bond yields, we
use a Wald test to determine the joint significance of the intercepts: H0: αi1 = 0∧ . . .∧ αiP = 0.
The test statistic is asymptotically χ2-distributed with P degrees of freedom.2
In the second model, we change the functional form of the liquidity premium: all portfolios
share a common intercept and a portfolio-specific liquidity variable is added to the regression
equation. Formally, regression model 2 reads
Y ipt = α
i +
2∑
j=1
βijpFjt +
3∑
j=1
γijC
i
jpt + δ
iLipt + ε
i
pt, (2)
where the definitions of the Fama-French factors, the portfolio characteristics and the assump-
tions on the disturbances are equal to those in Equation (1) and Lipt is the value of the liquidity
proxy of the pth proxy-i portfolio on day t in deviation from its daily average; so, if lipt denotes
2There is caveat in the interpretation of the test results: if we want to test whether proxy i is a good liquidity
proxy, we are actually testing a joint hypothesis: illiquidity leads to yield increases and proxy i is a proxy for
liquidity; see also Kempf and Uhrig-Homburg (2000) and Jankowitsch, Mo¨senbacher and Pichler (2002). If we
reject this joint hypothesis, then either illiquidity does not lead to yield increases or i is not a good liquidity proxy
(or both). Given the strong empirical evidence mentioned in Section 2, we feel confident that a rejection of the
joint hypothesis can in fact be traced to i being an inadequate liquidity proxy.
8
the value of the liquidity proxy, and l¯it is its daily average, i.e.
l¯it =
1
P
P∑
p=1
lipt,
then Lipt is calculated as L
i
pt = l
i
pt− l¯it. We have chosen this normalization of the liquidity proxy
to correct for a possible change in the mean during our sample period. For example, the average
amount outstanding has risen from E353 million on the first day of our sample to E434 million
on the last day.
In Equation (2), the portfolio-specific intercepts of Equation (1) have been replaced by
a single intercept and an additional regressor has been introduced that contains a proxy for
portfolio p’s liquidity. This changes the functional form of the liquidity premium: the constant
liquidity premium of αip in model 1 has been replaced by a time-varying premium α
i + δiLipt,
that is linear in the value of the liquidity proxy (in deviation from its mean). Here, the null
hypothesis of no liquidity effect is tested with a Wald test on the joint significance of αi and
δi: H0: αi = 0 ∧ δi = 0. The test statistic is asymptotically χ2-distributed with 2 degrees of
freedom. The joint hypothesis problem discussed above also applies here.
We now discuss the choice for the number of portfolios P for both models. For model 1, we
create two portfolios for each liquidity proxy. This gives an intuitive interpretation of portfolio 1
as the ‘liquid portfolio’ and portfolio 2 as the ‘illiquid portfolio’. Moreover, the difference αi2−αi1
between the two intercepts can be interpreted as the yield premium investors get for bearing
liquidity risk caused by proxy i. In model 2, we have to estimate the slope coefficient δi,
i.e. the relation between a portfolio’s value for liquidity proxy i and its excess yield. Clearly,
two portfolios would be insufficient to estimate a slope. However, using ‘too much’ portfolios
diminishes the power of the Wald test; see Lys and Sabino (1992). From their Figure 1, it
follows that if the portfolios contain approximately 25% of the bonds, the power of the test of
no relation between the liquidity proxy and the excess yield is maximized. Therefore, we use 4
portfolios for model 2.
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3.3 Comparison
Given the large number of liquidity proxies that have been proposed in the literature, a natural
question to ask is whether all proxies are equally suited to proxy bond liquidity or if some proxies
work better than others. We follow Goldreich et al. (2002) by running a series of regressions
with pairwise combinations of the liquidity proxies. For each combination (i, k) of proxies, we
estimate a regression like Equation (2) for proxy i, augmented with proxy k
Y ipt = α
i +
2∑
j=1
βijpFjt +
3∑
j=1
γijC
i
jpt + δ
iLipt + δ
ikLikpt + ε
ik
pt, (3)
where Likpt is the value of liquidity proxy k for the p
th proxy-i portfolio in deviation of its
daily average. Further, the coefficients are defined and disturbances behave as in Equation (1).
In this regression equation3, we test for the significance of δik. If it is significant, we say
that ‘k adds explanatory power to i’, and otherwise we say that ‘k is subsumed by i’ (this
follows the terminology in Goldreich et al. (2002)). By repeating this procedure for all possible
combinations, we can count the number of times a proxy adds power to another proxy, and the
number of times a proxy subsumes another proxy. This allows us to rank the different liquidity
proxies we consider.
3.4 Liquidity Proxies
Empirical papers that examined liquidity in bond or equity markets, used both direct measures
(based on transaction data) and indirect measures (based on bond characteristics and/or end-
of-day prices). Examples of direct liquidity measures are quoted bid-ask spreads, effective bid-ask
spreads, quote sizes, trade sizes, quote frequencies, trade frequencies and trading volume. For
corporate bonds, where most transactions occur on the over-the-counter market, these direct
measures are often not reliable and difficult to obtain. Therefore, we use indirect liquidity proxies
3Goldreich et al. (2002) first orthogonalized the values of proxy k relative to proxy i and used the orthogo-
nalized values in Equation (3) instead of Likpt. This is not necessary, since, by the Frisch-Waugh theorem (see e.g.
Greene, 2000, Section 6.4.3)), the regression already ‘automatically’ does this for us.
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instead. By searching the theoretical and empirical liquidity literature, we found eight liquidity
proxies that can be implemented on our data set.4 Table 1 shows which papers used which
proxies and the effects they found; two proxies, missing prices and yield dispersion, are not
mentioned in this table, because they were not used in previous studies. We will now discuss
each proxy in more detail, elaborating on their interpretation, their expected effect on bond
yields and theoretical and/or empirical evidence.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
Issued Amount
The issued amount of a bond is often assumed to give an indication of its liquidity. Most in-
vestment banks use it as liquidity criterion in building their bond indices; for example, Lehman
Brothers uses this criterion for their Euro-Aggregate Corporate Bond index. Its use was first
proposed by Fisher (1959), who claimed that large issues should trade more often, so that the
proxy issued amount is actually a proxy for the direct liquidity measure trading volume. Since
Fisher, several alternative hypotheses have been put forward that also predict a positive effect
of issued amount on liquidity (and thus on bond prices). In market microstructure models,
like Smidt (1971) and Garman (1976), transaction costs arise, because dealers hold inventories.
Further, dealers’ inventory costs are higher if it is more difficult to obtain information about a
security and if the expected holding time is longer. Crabbe and Turner (1995) subsequently rea-
soned that large issues may have lower information costs, since more investors own them or have
analyzed its features; similarly, information about small issues may be less broadly disseminated
among investors. Therefore, small issues will have a higher yield due to an illiquidity premium.
Another frequently heard argument, for instance in Sarig and Warga (1989) and Amihud and
Mendelson (1991), is that bonds with smaller issued amounts tend to get locked in buy-and-hold
portfolios more easily, reducing the tradable amount and thus their liquidity. To summarize the
4We would like to stress that by selecting liquidity proxies from theoretical research and from empirical research
on other data bases, the effects of data-snooping on portfolio-based tests, as described by Lo and MacKinlay (1990),
are probably limited.
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above, we hypothesize a negative effect of issued amount on yields.
Table 1 shows that many empirical papers considered issued amount as liquidity proxy. The
papers on Treasury bonds found negative and mostly significant effects, so that larger Treasury
issues have lower yields, as expected. Research on corporate bonds is inconclusive, though: both
negative and positive coefficients are observed. McGinty (2001) confirmed this by showing that
even though most large issues in his corporate bond sample were liquid, some large issues were
illiquid and some small issues were liquid.
Coupon
Amihud and Mendelson (1991) argued that financial institutions that are constrained to dis-
tribute only coupon income on their investments may prefer bonds with higher coupon per-
centages. This higher demand for high-coupon bonds implies lower yields. On the other hand,
coupon is also frequently seen as a proxy for tax effects; see e.g. Shiller and Modigliani (1979):
if coupon income is taxed, then bonds with higher coupons will have higher before-tax yields.
The predicted sign of the proxy coupon is thus ambiguous.
Few empirical papers employed the proxy coupon; see Table 1. Two papers found an in-
significant, positive coefficient, whereas one paper found a significant negative effect.
Listed
Alexander et al. (2000) reasoned that companies whose equity is listed on a stock exchange must
disclose more information than privately held companies. According to the market microstruc-
ture models mentioned above, the costs of making a market in bonds of listed firms should thus
be smaller. Therefore, we hypothesize that the proxy listed is associated with higher liquidity
and lower yields.
Since Alexander et al. (2000) were the only authors to use the liquidity proxy listed, the
empirical evidence is limited to their results. Contrary to their expectations, they found that
issues of private firms trade more actively and thus are more liquid than issues of listed firms.
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Their explanation of this result was that for private firms debt is the only investment vehicle,
while for public firms both debt and equity are traded; therefore, debt of private firms might
trade more and have higher liquidity.
Age
The age of a bond is a popular proxy of its liquidity. Sarig and Warga (1989) observed that as
a bond gets older, an increasing percentage of its issued amount is absorbed in investors’ buy-
and-hold portfolios. Thus, the older a bond gets, the less trading takes place, and the less liquid
it becomes. Moreover, once a bond becomes illiquid, its stays illiquid until it matures. McGinty
(2001) and Schultz (2001) also noted that new issues trade more than old issues. McGinty
mentioned lead managers’ commitment to making market in the newly issued bond. Schultz
pointed out that new issues are typically under priced, so that traders buy bonds after the
offering and sell them shortly thereafter. Following these arguments, we hypothesize a positive
relation between age and yield.
Empirical research strongly confirms the positive effect of age on yields; see Table 1. This
finding holds for corporate and sovereign bonds and for US and European data sets. Moreover,
Schultz (2001) found evidence for the argument by Sarig and Warga (1989), since in his sample
most bonds were bought and not sold; in other words, the bonds were put in buy-and-hold
portfolios.
Market practitioners often use a threshold value to determine if a bond is ‘old’ or ‘young’:
for some T , they mark all bonds with an age smaller than T as ‘young’ and an age larger than
T as ‘old’. Some academic papers also use such a dichotomous approach for the liquidity proxy
age. For instance, Alexander et al. (2000) set T = 2 years, Ericsson and Renault (2001) used
T = 3 months, and Elton et al. (2002) employed a threshold value of 1 year. To determine
which threshold values give a useful division of bonds, we estimate model 1 from two portfolios,
where portfolio 1 contains all bonds younger than T months and portfolio 2 older than T
months, for T = 2, 4, . . . , 30. The difference α2 − α1 between the portfolio intercepts, i.e. the
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liquidity premium between old and young bonds, and the significance of the Wald test on H0:
α2−α1 = 0 are displayed in Figure 1. Thresholds from 4 to 24 months give rise to a significant
liquidity premium, while the 2-month threshold and thresholds larger than 24 months do not.
All thresholds, except for the smallest of 2 months, yield a significant premium of at least 10
bps. The division between young and old bonds seems to be the strongest for a threshold of 14
months, where the premium equals 36 bps. For the remainder of this study, we arbitrarily use
a threshold of 1 year for the proxy age, although any other value between 4 months and 2 years
could also be used.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
Missing Prices
The occurrence of ‘price runs’ and missing values is our first liquidity proxy that uses market
information. Sarig and Warga (1989) argued that if the liquidity of a bond is sufficiently low,
it may happen that on some business days there is virtually no trading in that bond. In their
data set, this was recorded as a ‘price run’: two consecutive prices for a bond were identical.
We extend their notion of illiquidity by considering not only the occurrence of a price run, but
also the occurrence of a missing value, since in both cases there is no activity in that bond on
that day. We will jointly refer to these events as the proxy missing prices. We hypothesize a
positive relation between missing prices and yield.
Yield Volatility
The proxy yield volatility is a measure of yield uncertainty. In the market microstructure
models discussed above, dealers’ inventory costs are higher if information uncertainty is higher.
An important source of uncertainty is related to the predictability of future yield movements.
Therefore, we hypothesize that a higher yield volatility leads to larger bid-ask spreads, and thus
to lower liquidity and higher yields.
The empirical evidence for yield uncertainty as liquidity proxy is mixed; see Table 1. Shul-
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man et al. (1993) used price volatility as proxy for price uncertainty and found a significantly
positive effect on bond spreads. Hong and Warga (2000) proxied uncertainty with squared price
return and estimated a positive and significant coefficient in a regression using bid-ask spread as
dependent variable; this also implies a positive effect of uncertainty on bond yields. Alexander
et al. (2000) approximated uncertainty as the average of absolute price returns; in their regres-
sions, they found a significant, positive effect on trading volume, implying a negative relation
between uncertainty and yields.
Number of Contributors
The number of contributors is our following proxy of a bond’s liquidity, and the first that uses
quote composition information. In Ericsson and Renault (2001), a larger number of active
traders competing for the same bond leads to a smaller price discount for illiquidity and thus
a smaller yield premium. Alternatively, Gehr and Martell (1992) and Jankowitsch et al. (2002)
argued that a larger number of market participants makes it easier to trade a bond, because it
is easier to find a counter party for a transaction and large orders can be split up into smaller
parts without affecting the market price. Either way, we hypothesize a positive relation between
the proxy number of contributors and liquidity and therefore expect a negative effect of this
proxy on bond yields.
Direct empirical evidence on the number of contributors liquidity proxy is limited. Jankow-
itsch et al. (2002) found that bonds with more contributors have lower yields for all but one
of the six European countries they analyzed. Indirect evidence is provided by Schultz (2001),
who showed that there was a positive relation between the number of trades in a bond and the
number of dealers as counter parties. Further, the results of Gehr and Martell (1992) showed a
negative, though insignificant effect of the number of dealers on the bid-ask spread.
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Yield Dispersion
Our final liquidity proxy, yield dispersion, reflects the extent to which market participants agree
on the value of a bond. Tychon and Vannetelbosch (2002) derived a model that predicts that
if investors have more heterogeneous beliefs, the liquidity premium is larger. The inventory
costs argument, mentioned above, applies here as well, since dealers face more uncertainty if
prices show a larger diffusion among contributors. Either way, we hypothesize a positive relation
between scatter and bond yields.
We proxy this notion of liquidity with a yield dispersion statistic, which has not been used
before in the literature, as far as we know. We define the yield dispersion of bond b on day t as
the standard deviation of percentage yield differences relative to the mean
Dispersionbt =
√√√√ 1
nbt − 1
nbt∑
s=1
(
ybts − y¯bt
y¯bt
)2
, (4)
where ybts is the yield quoted by pricing source s, y¯bt is the average yield and nbt is the number
of contributors. This proxy can only be calculated if we have at least two quotes for a bond on
a particular day, i.e. if nbt > 1.
Application
Table 2 gives details on the calculation of each liquidity proxy. It also shows the expected sign
of the proxy. To get the lipt variable of Section 3.2, we multiply proxies with a negative expected
sign by −1. After this transformation, the δi coefficient of model 2 is hypothesized to be positive
for all proxies; this facilitates checking the results with the hypotheses. Finally, the table shows
the order in which bonds are put in the portfolios: the first portfolio always contains the bonds
that are hypothesized to be most liquid, the last portfolio contains bonds that we expect to be
most illiquid.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
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As described in Section 3.2, every two weeks the portfolios for each liquidity proxy are
rebalanced according to each bond’s value for that proxy. For the proxies issued amount, coupon,
listed (which are fixed characteristics of a bond) and age (which changes only gradually over
time), we use the value of the liquidity proxy on the rebalancing date. For the proxies missing
prices, number of contributors and yield dispersion (which depend on daily market information),
we use the average value over the two weeks prior the rebalancing date. For the proxy yield
volatility (which also depends on daily information), we calculate the standard deviation of the
observed yields over the two weeks prior to the rebalancing date. If for a particular bond it is
not possible to calculate the value of a liquidity proxy on the rebalancing date, that bond is
ignored for that proxy until the next rebalancing date.
4 Data
The data are downloaded from three different sources. Lehman Brothers provides the Interna-
tional Securities Identification Numbers (ISINs) of the members of their Euro-Aggregate Cor-
porate Bond index. The required characteristics of these corporate bonds are downloaded from
Bloomberg. Reuters 3000 EXtra provides daily bid yields of each bond quoted by different
pricing sources. The download period starts on 1 January 1999 and ends on 31 May 2001. The
ISINs are obtained for 31 May 2000. The total number of bonds on this date equaled 1190.
All bonds that are issued in euros directly after the currency’s introduction are included in this
analysis. Moreover, the yield time series of each corporate bond has at least twelve months
history.
4.1 Lehman Brothers
Lehman Brothers provides the ISINs of the corporate bonds in their Euro-Aggregate Corporate
Bond index. This index serves as a proxy of the investment-grade euro-denominated, corporate
bond market. Lehman Brothers imposes a number of criteria before the corporate bonds can
enter its index. All bonds must be denominated in euros or in one of the legacy currencies.
17
Further, all bonds are investment grade, have a fixed-rate coupon, at least one-year to maturity
and an issued amount of at least 150 million euro. The country of issuance and the country of
the issuer are no index criteria. The credit ratings of all corporate bonds are also provided by
Lehman Brothers. All ratings are downloaded for 31 May 2000. Due to data limitations, we have
kept these ratings unchanged during the whole sample period. Finally, their Euro-Aggregate
Corporate Bond BBB sub index is used to construct the Fama-French credit factor.
4.2 Bloomberg
Bloomberg provides the required bond characteristics. Using the ISINs that are given by Lehman
Brothers these characteristics are downloaded. In case an ISIN code is not recognized by
Bloomberg, the bond data are obtained from Lehman Brothers’ PC Product system. From
the initial 1190 ISINs, three are not available in the Bloomberg data base. The downloaded
corporate bond characteristics are: issued amount, issue date, maturity date, currency, call
dates, put dates and sinking fund dates. Euro-denominated par swap data, which are used to
calculate the two Fama-French factors and the portfolio excess yields, are also downloaded from
Bloomberg.
4.3 Reuters
Reuters 3000 EXtra provides the bid yields of the selected corporate bonds. Most corporate
bond yields in the Lehman Brothers Euro-Aggregate index are bid yields; only newly issued
corporate bonds have ask yields during their first month in the index; see Lehman Brothers
(1999). Therefore, we download bid yields from Reuters. For each corporate bond, all pricing
sources (also called contributors) are downloaded. We exclude two Reuters pricing sources, the
clearing agency ISMA and two anonymous pricing sources from the list of contributors, since
they are averages of other pricing sources. The total number of different pricing sources thus
obtained equals 74.
From the original 1190 ISINs in the Lehman Brothers Euro-Aggregate Corporate Bond index,
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191 bonds cannot be analyzed, because they either have no Reuters Identification Code (RIC)
that matches their ISIN or they do have a RIC but no contributor. For the remaining 999 bonds,
all bid yields from all pricing sources are downloaded. This means that a number of time series,
equal to the number of pricing sources, shows the yield development of each bond. Most bonds
are quoted by more than one pricing source.
5 Results
We first present the results of applying the Fama-French bond-market model to the entire sample
and show the extension of this model with portfolio characteristics. Next, the regression results
for models 1 and 2 are given. Finally, the performance of the liquidity proxies is compared.
5.1 Entire Sample
We first test whether the two-factor Fama-French model can be used to describe the average
excess yield of all bonds in our sample. This test is relevant, because Fama and French (1993)
applied their model to realized returns of US bonds, while we analyze yields of euro-dominated
bonds. We estimate the following model
Yt = α+
2∑
j=1
βjFjt + εt, εt ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ2), (5)
where the excess yield Yt is the average bond yield, calculated over all bonds in the sample,
minus the one-year euro swap rate, the slope factor F1t is defined as the ten-year swap rate
minus the one-year swap rate of the previous day and the credit factor F2t is calculated as the
Lehman Brothers Euro-Aggregate Corporate Bond BBB sub-index minus the ten-year euro swap
rate.
The first row of Table 3 shows the R2 and the estimated coefficients along with their t-
values. The R2 value is high and comparable to the values reported by Fama and French (1993).
The estimated slope and credit coefficients have the expected positive sign and are strongly
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statistically significant. The intercept is not statistically significant, so that the Fama-French
model cannot be rejected for the entire sample.
To test our choice for approximating default-free interest rates with swap rates, regression
model (5) is estimated again, but with the swap rates replaced by the government rates. So,
the excess yields and the slope and credit factors are now calculated with government yields.
Our proxy for euro government rates is the Lehman Brothers Euro-Aggregate Treasury index.
The second row of Table 3 shows the regression results. Both the R2 and the t-values of the
slope and credit factors have decreased compared to the model with swap rates. Moreover, the
intercept is now significantly different from zero. Therefore, the Fama-French model should be
rejected in case government rates are used as default-free rates. This empirically confirms our
choice for using swap rates as proxy for default-free interest rates instead of Treasury rates.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
5.2 Characteristics
As recommended by Gebhardt et al. (2001), we analyze the added value of incorporating char-
acteristics into the model. We consider three characteristics:
• Rating: rating of the bond’s issuer at 31 May 2000: AAA, AA, A or BBB.
• Maturity: the remaining time to maturity of a bond, measured in years.
• Euro: whether a bond is denominated in euros or in one of the legacy currencies. This
variable was not used in Gebhardt et al. (2001), who studied US data, but we nevertheless
consider it to be relevant for our data set. The motivation is that the market generally
sees legacy bonds as less liquid, because these bonds are relatively old, not well known to
investors and more difficult to trade due to the legacy currency.5
To determine whether a characteristic is important for explaining excess bond yields, we
follow the same procedure as for our liquidity proxies, as described in Section 3.2, except that
5Despite its liquidity interpretation, we do not include the euro characteristic in our list of liquidity proxies,
since it is specific to our data set of European bonds just after introduction of the euro. Therefore, it is irrelevant
for non-European data sets and for more recent European data sets, since the legacy-denominated bonds will
gradually disappear from the market.
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the null model is now the Fama-French model of the previous section. For each characteristic i,
we create portfolios and estimate the following regression model
Y ipt = α
i
p +
2∑
j=1
βijpFjt + ε
i
pt,
where the assumptions on the disturbances are equal to those in Equation (1). For the charac-
teristic rating, we create four portfolios: portfolio 1 contains the AAA-rated bonds, portfolio 2
the AAs, portfolio 3 the As, and portfolio 4 the BBBs. For the characteristic maturity, two
portfolios are constructed: portfolio 1 consists of the 50% shortest bonds, and portfolio 2 of
the 50% longest bonds.6 Finally, for the characteristic euro, two portfolios are created as well:
portfolio 1 contains the euro-denominated bonds and portfolio 2 the legacy bonds.
The regression results are reported in Table 4. For rating, we find that the intercepts are
larger for lower ratings, although the step from AA to A is very small. All Fama-French factor
loadings all significant. The Wald test indicates that the four intercepts are jointly highly signifi-
cant. For maturity, the intercepts of the portfolios reveal that short-maturity bonds have smaller
yields than long-maturity bonds, with an average difference of 38 bps. The null hypothesis that
the two intercepts are jointly equal to zero is easily rejected. Finally, for euro, the results imply
that euro-denominated bonds have smaller yields than legacy bonds, with an average spread of
21 bps between them. Again, the Wald statistic is significant.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
From these results, we conclude that the rating, maturity and euro characteristics are impor-
tant determinants of excess yield in the euro corporate bond market. To make the characteristics
operational, we have to transform them to a numerical scale:
• Rating: the letters are mapped as follows: AAA=1, AA=2, A=3 and BBB=4. Al-
though this linearity assumption is somewhat crude, it is not uncommon in the literature.
Moreover, since our bonds are all investment grade, and the non-linearities in S&P’s and
6The portfolios are updated every two weeks, just like in Section 3.2.
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Moody’s rating scales are especially apparent for speculative grade ratings, we believe that
the linear scale is a reasonable approximation.
• Maturity: this is already a continuous variable, and thus needs no transformation.
• Euro: this characteristic is represented by an indicator variable that equals 1 if the bond
is denominated in euros, and 0 if it is denominated in a legacy currency.
The value of characteristic j for the pth proxy-i portfolio on day t, denoted Cijpt in Section 3.2,
is calculated analogously to the liquidity variable Lipt below Equation (2). For instance, for the
characteristic maturity, Cijpt is the average maturity of all quoted bonds in the p
th proxy-i
portfolio on day t, in deviation from the average maturity of all quoted bonds on day t.
5.3 Model 1
For the first regression model, Equation (1), we create two portfolios for all eight liquidity
proxies. Table 5 contains some summary statistics for these 16 portfolios, averaged over the full
sample period of 602 trading days. We observe that the average yields and average liquidity
proxies of portfolio 1 (containing the hypothesized liquid bonds) and portfolio 2 (illiquid bonds)
are quite different. The yield deviations range from -28 bps (for age) to 8 bps (for number of
contributors). Except for the latter proxy, we could prematurely conclude that the liquidity
premium is negative, since portfolio 1 has a higher average yield than portfolio 2. However, it
is not correct to fully attribute the yield differences to differences in liquidity, since the average
maturity and the average rating also vary. Therefore, this table illustrates the necessity of
correcting for differences in maturity and rating.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
Table 6 displays the results of estimating model 1 for all liquidity proxies; recall from Sec-
tion 3.2 that the Fama-French factors have portfolio-specific coefficients and the characteristics
common coefficients. All Fama-French factor loadings are statistically significant and have the
expected positive sign. The same holds for the coefficients of the rating and maturity char-
acteristics (with one exception: the rating coefficient for issued amount is insignificant). The
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coefficient for the euro characteristic is mostly insignificant, though it does have the expected
negative sign for seven out of eight cases. All R2-values are around 98%.
Except for the liquidity proxy listed, all intercept pairs are jointly statistically different from
zero at a 95% significance level, as evidenced by the p-values of the Wald statistics. This
indicates that the remaining seven proxies are indeed able to separate the bonds in our data set
into two mutually exclusive portfolios that have statistically different yields, after controlling for
differences in maturity, rating and currency. Next we look at the portfolio intercepts themselves.
If our hypotheses on the sign of the liquidity effects are correct, the intercept of portfolio 1 should
be smaller than that of portfolio 2 for all liquidity proxies. We see that this holds for seven out
of eight cases; for listed the order is reversed, but this poses no problem, since the Wald test
already indicated that for this proxy the null model cannot be rejected. Further, for the proxy
coupon, the results show that low coupon bonds have lower yields than high coupon bonds; this
contradicts the liquidity hypothesis of Amihud and Mendelson (1991), but instead supports the
alternative interpretation of coupon as tax and/or credit risk proxy.
Another way of looking at the intercepts, is to calculate their differences αi2 − αi1, which we
interpret as the liquidity premium for proxy i. The significance of a premium is tested with a
Wald test with null hypothesisH0: αi2−αi1 = 0; the test statistic is asymptotically χ2-distributed
with 1 degree of freedom. The second to last column of Table 6 shows that the premiums for
proxies yield dispersion and age are the largest with 24 bps and 20 bps, respectively, while
the premiums for the other proxies are between 9 and 13 bps. All premiums are statistically
significant at the 95% confidence level.
[Insert Table 6 around here]
5.4 Model 2
For model 2, we create four portfolios since it maximizes the power of the test for the presence
of liquidity effects; see Section 3.2. Unfortunately, this means we cannot conduct the test for
proxies listed and age, since they are both binary variables (‘listed’ versus ‘not listed’, and
23
‘young’ versus ‘old’). The summary statistics for the other six proxies are shown in Table 7.
Clearly, the differences between the portfolios are now larger than in Table 5, since we have
assigned the bonds to four size percentiles instead of two.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
The regression results are displayed in Table 8.7 The Wald statistic that tests for the joint
significance of the intercept and the coefficient of the liquidity proxy is statistically significant
for all six proxies. So, also using model 2, we find statistical evidence of the presence of liquidity
effects in our data set. The signs of all liquidity coefficients are positive, as hypothesized.
[Insert Table 8 around here]
5.5 Comparison
Table 9 summarizes the results of conducting the pair wise comparisons between the liquidity
proxies, as described in Section 3.3. For each proxy i, we count the number of times it adds
power to a model that already contains proxy j. We also count the number of times a proxy j is
subsumed if it is added to the model of proxy i. Looking at the sum of both counts, we see that
proxies number of contributors and yield dispersion perform somewhat better than the other
four proxies, but the differences are small. Although, the test does not yield a clear winner, we
do see that missing prices performs worst of all proxies.
[Insert Table 9 around here]
6 Summary
In this paper, we used the Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) methodology to test whether
bond market liquidity is priced based on several liquidity proxies. Eight proxies were imple-
mented: issued amount, coupon, listed, age, missing prices, yield volatility, number of contribu-
tors and yield dispersion. For each liquidity proxy, we constructed mutually exclusive portfolios.
7The Fama-French factor loadings and the coefficients for the portfolio characteristic are omitted from Table 8
for space considerations.
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The time series of portfolio yields were subsequently used in two Fama and French (1993) re-
gression models, augmented with portfolio characteristics as recommended by Gebhardt et al.
(2001), to control for differences in interest rate risk, credit risk, maturity, rating and currency
between the portfolios. We also conducted pair wise comparisons of the liquidity proxies, as
proposed by Goldreich et al. (2002).
The results indicated that the null hypothesis of no liquidity premium should be rejected
for seven out of eight liquidity proxies. The premium between liquid and illiquid portfolios
depended on the liquidity proxy and ranged from 9 to 24 basis points. The highest premiums
were found for the proxies age and yield dispersion. The pairwise comparison tests point out
that no proxy stands out from the rest.
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Figure 1: Liquidity premiums for different age thresholds.†
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† Solid () and empty () squares denote significance and insignificance, respectively, of the Wald test on the
joint significance of the two intercepts (p-value < 0.05).
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Table 1: Overview of liquidity proxies from the empirical bond liquidity literature.†
Liquidity proxies
Authorsa Data
issued
amount
coupon listed age
yield
volatility
number of
contributors
Corporate bonds
AEF00 US −∗ +∗ +∗ −∗
CT95 US 
EGAM02 US  +∗
ER01 US +∗
GM92 US + − + −
HW00 US −∗ +∗ +∗
M01 EMU  
MR02 US + −
S01 US +
SBP93 US  +∗
Treasury bonds
AM91 US −∗
EG98 US +∗
F02 US 
JMP02 EMUb −∗ −∗
K02 US −∗
KU00c Germany −∗
SW89 US − +∗
W92 US − + +∗
Corporate & Treasury bonds
DN02 Spain +∗ −∗ +∗
Corporate, municipal & Treasury bonds
CS99 US +∗
† Legend: − negative; + positive; ∗ significant;  insignificant.
a AEF00=Alexander, Edwards and Ferri (2000), AM91=Amihud and Mendelson (1991),
CS99=Chakravarty and Sarkar (1999), CT95=Crabbe and Turner (1995), DN02=Dı´az and
Navarro (2002), EG98=Elton and Green (1998), EGAM02=Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann
(2002), ER01=Ericsson and Renault (2001), F02=Fleming (2002), GM92=Gehr and Martell
(1992), HW00=Hong and Warga (2000), JMP02=Jankowitsch, Mo¨senbacher and Pichler (2002),
K02=Krishnamurthy (2002), KU00=Kempf and Uhrig-Homburg (2000), M01=McGinty (2001),
MR02=Mullineaux and Roten (2002), S01=Schultz (2001), SBP93=Shulman, Bayless and Price
(1993), SW89=Sarig and Warga (1989), W92=Warga (1992).
b JMP02 considered 6 countries: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and The Netherlands.
c We used the price discounts in KU00’s Table 2 to calculate the impact of maturity on yields.
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Table 3: Results for the entire sample†
Intercept Slope Credit R2
Swap rates 0.0371 0.785 0.173 97.9%
(1.01) (36.5) (6.66)
Government rates 0.419 0.540 0.273 95.0%
(12.4) (31.4) (5.46)
† Regression results for the Fama-French model estimated from the entire
sample with either swap rates or government rates as default-free interest
rates (t-values between parentheses).
Table 4: Results for the characteristics portfolios.†
Intercept Slope Credit Wald R2
Rating
AAA -0.220 0.736 0.0838 946 97.2%
(8.30) (46.8) (4.40) (0.00)
AA 0.120 0.732 0.0310
(5.60) (55.8) (2.04)
A 0.122 0.856 0.295
(4.95) (59.4) (15.8)
BBB 0.453 0.824 0.435
(8.28) (24.4) (10.6)
Maturity
short -0.135 0.635 0.165 474 98.8%
(3.09) (25.0) (5.36) (0.00)
long 0.247 0.944 0.138
(13.6) (82.0) (10.6)
Euro
euro -0.066 0.888 0.291 112 97.8%
(1.85) (42.1) (11.2) (0.00)
legacy 0.139 0.682 0.0242
(5.53) (45.7) (1.35)
† Regression results for the Fama-French model estimated from portfolios based on
the rating, maturity and euro characteristics (t-values between parentheses). The
Wald column shows the test on the joint significance of the intercepts (p-value
between parentheses).
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Table 5: Portfolio statistics P = 2.†
Yielda Maturityb Ratingc Liquidityd
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Issued amount 5.33 5.09 6.47 4.64 2.20 2.10 0.65 0.20
Coupon 5.21 5.21 6.05 5.04 2.14 2.16 4.29 6.91
Listed 5.26 5.01 5.68 5.11 2.27 1.66 1.00 0.00
Age 5.44 5.16 6.91 5.31 2.42 2.09 0.64 3.80
Missing prices 5.28 5.07 6.09 4.57 2.18 2.10 0.19 0.46
Yield volatility 5.21 5.21 6.11 5.06 2.10 2.20 0.06 0.10
Number of contributors 5.19 5.27 5.58 5.56 2.13 2.19 2.31 0.76
Yield dispersion 5.40 5.14 7.42 4.91 2.18 2.13 0.47 1.50
† Summary statistics of the two constructed portfolios using the eight liquidity indicators.
Portfolio 1 (respectively 2) contains the bonds that are hypothesized to be most liquid
(respectively most illiquid).
a Average portfolio yield.
b Average time to maturity in years.
c Average credit worthiness, measured on the following scale: AAA=1, AA=2, A=3,
BBB=4.
d Average value of the liquidity proxy.
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Table 8: Results for model 2.†
Intercept Liquidity Walda R2
Issued amount 0.0316 0.338 147 97.9%
(1.32) (11.9) (0.00)
Coupon 0.0405 0.0569 65.3 97.6%
(1.71) (8.07) (0.00)
Missing prices 0.0894 0.357 66.2 96.3%
(3.23) (7.92) (0.00)
Yield volatility 0.0522 1.06 17.9 96.7%
(2.30) (3.37) (0.00)
Number of contributors 0.102 0.00100 15.9 96.2%
(3.99) (0.173) (0.00)
Yield dispersion 0.0855 0.0335 28.9 97.8%
(4.26) (3.15) (0.00)
† Regression results for the Fama-French model augmented with portfolio
characteristics and a liquidity variable (see Equation (2)) estimated from
four portfolios based on one of six liquidity proxies (t-values between paren-
theses). The coefficients and t-values of the Fama-French factors and the
characteristics are omitted for space considerations.
a Test on the joint significance of the intercept and the coefficient of the
liquidity variable (p-value between parentheses).
Table 9: Results of the comparison tests.†
Adds power Subsumes Total
Issued amount 4 1 5
Coupon 3 2 5
Missing prices 2 1 3
Yield volatility 2 3 5
Number of contributors 4 2 6
Yield dispersion 4 2 6
† Results of the pair wise comparisons of six liquidity proxies (see
Equation (3)). The table displays the number of times a proxy
adds explanatory power to another proxy and the number of times
a proxy subsumes another proxy.
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